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CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - WARRANTLESS
SEARCH INCIDENT TO VALID ARREST
United States v. Robbins,
424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970);
Faubion v. United States,
424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970).
In United States v. Robbins' and Faubion v. United States2 two
courts of appeals recently examined the scope of a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. In Robbins, the appellant and three com-
panions aroused the suspicion of a motel manager by using a stolen
credit card. The manager summoned the police who entered the
defendants' rooms with a passkey when permissive entry was re-
fused. The police arrested the defendants and searched their rooms.
The search included their suitcases, which contained pistols and other
items. The defendants and their possessions were taken to the police
station where a second search of one of the suitcases produced
counterfeit $20 bills, stuffed inside a glove. The appellant was tried
and convicted for the possession of counterfeit money. The district
court found that the officers had probable cause to make the war-
rantless arrests and that the search of the motel rooms was legiti-
mate. Surprisingly, the issue of the validity of the second search was
not raised at the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
one judge dissenting, affirmed the district court's findings and, in
addition, found that the second search of the suitcase in the police
station was lawful.<
In Faubion, the defendant had been arrested in Oklahoma on
the basis of a warrant held by Arkansas authorities charging him
and his wife with offenses unrelated to the present controversy. 4
Faubion and his wife waived extradition and accompanied the Ar-
kansas authorities back to Arkansas. During the trip Faubion
started to make a statement. The Arkansas authorities contended
that they stopped him and apprised him of his rights, but Faubion
professed that he was not warned before making his full statement.
1424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970).
2424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970).
3 The court of appeals specifically asked both parties to brief this question. 424 F.2d
at 58.
4 Because the court reversed the lower court's ruling on the search and seizure issue,
it did not have to deal with the legality of the arrest. It concluded, however, that it
was probably a valid arrest. See Reed v. United States, 364 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 918 (1967), construing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 196 (1969).
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Regardless, he told them there were two handguns, belonging to a
friend, in his luggage. When the Faubions arrived in Arkansas,
they were booked, their luggage was opened, and two guns were
found. Subsequently, Faubion was convicted of interstate transpor-
tation of stolen firearms.5 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the district court decision, hold-
ing that the guns should have been excluded from evidence because
the warrantless search was not incident to the arrest, and that Faub-
ion did not consent to the search when he disclosed the presence of
weapons in his luggage.
The law surrounding the permissible scope of a warrantless search
incident to a valid arrest has varied tremendously during the past 25
years. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United
States' upheld a warrantless search of a four-room apartment. One
year later, in Trupiano v. United States,7 the Court stated that law
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever
"reasonably practicable."" Then in 1950, in United States v. Rabino-
witz,' the Court rejected the Trupiano rule, holding that a war-
rantless search of an entire room was reasonable because it only ex-
tended to an area under the possession and control of the person
arrested. 10 The Rabinowitz standard of possession and control was
utilized by the Court in Preston v. United States," where burglary
tools obtained in a warrantless search of defendant's car, the search
being removed in time and place from the arrest for vagrancy, were
held inadmissible as evidence because the car was no longer in the
possession or control of the person arrested.12 On June 23, 1969, the
5 Federal Firearms Act § 2(g), ch. 850, § 2(g), 52 Stat. 1251 (1938). The Federal
Firearms Act was later repealed and replaced by portions of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-81 (Supp. IV, 1969).
6 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
7 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
81d. at 705.
9 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
10 There were many critical commentaries concerning the confusion which followed
Rabinowitz. See, e.g., J. LIANDYNSIa, SEARcH AND SEizURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
87-117 (1966); Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE LJ.
433 (1969).
"1376 U.S. 364 (1964).
12 But see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), where the Court upheld the
warrantless search of a car during which heroin was found in the glove compartment.
The car had been impounded "as evidence" pursuant to a California statute which
provided for the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in violation of the narcotics
laws. The search occurred 1 week after the defendant was arrested for selling heroin
to a police informer. Cooper is based in part on the Rabinowitz rationale which em-
phasized the reasonableness of the search as opposed to whether it was reasonable to
procure a search warrant. Rabinowitz was overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
19701
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Supreme Court overruled Harris and Rabinowitz in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia."3 The new Chimel rule states that a warrantless search inci-
dent to a valid arrest can extend only to an area in the immediate
vicinity of the person arrested, where a weapon might be obtained
or where the arrested person might be able to destroy evidence.
The court in Faubion held the warrantless search invalid without
employing the Chimel decision. 4 It reasoned that the search was
not incident to a valid arrest because it was not contemporaneous
in time and place with the arrest. 5 In addition, the court held that
Faubion did not consent to the search because he did not employ
the traditional language conveying voluntary accession to the inva-
sion. The substance of Faubion's statement was probable cause to
sustain an affidavit for a search warrant, but it did not bring the
search within the permissible scope of the fourth amendment.
The main argument of the dissenting opinion in Faubion, sum-
marily dismissed by the majority, was that a search was not involved.
The dissent pointed out that in order to constitute a search there
must be the element of intent. The police in this case were merely
conducting an inventory procedure and had no intention of dis-
covering any evidence to be used in prosecuting the crime charged.
752 (1969). Therefore, in the future, Cooper will only be good authority in those
cases where, under a statute, an automobile is deemed to be an instrumentality of the
crime. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,49 n.7 (1970).
'3 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14 Since the search in Faubion took place prior to the date of the Chimel decision,
June 23, 1969, the Faubion court did not consider Chimel applicable. On the other
hand, both the majority and dissent in Robbins cite Chimel as applicable, although
the Ro bins opinion does not indicate when the searches of the suitcase took place.
In the Sixth Circuit, however, Preston had been recognized as a prelude to a Chimel rule
in Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 399 U.S. 519 (1970). The Supreme Court has not passed on the retroactive
application of Chimel. Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969); Von Cleef v. New
Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). It may, however, do so in the near future. See Williams
v. United States, 418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 986 (1970).
(No. 1125, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 81, 1970 Term).
' Accord, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
Cases both before and after Chiinel have recognized that in certain exigent circum-
stances a valid warrantless search not incident to an arrest may be made. One example
is the "automobile cases" where, because of the mobile nature of the automobile, the
Court has allowed a warrantless search of the vehicle before it can be removed from
the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Even in these cases, however,
the arresting officer must have probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence
will be found in the automobile. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 106 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1923). Other examples are hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),
and consent, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
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Thus, the dissent concluded that the police action did not constitute
a search, much less an illegal search.'
The Robbins court found both the original search and the second
search of the suitcase at the police station consistent with the Chimel
rule. The first search of the immediate premises was validated since
the officers had probable cause to believe there were concealed
weapons. The second s6arch was validated as a continuation of the
first. Because local police practice required the arrested persons to
be brought into the police station and allowed to make a phone call
within 1 hour of the arrest, the court considered the arrest, the
gathering of personal effects, the transportation to the station, and
the search at the station all parts of the continuous first search.
The court also upheld the second search on the separate ground
that it was the duty of the officers to make an inventory of the con-
tents of the suitcase, but it did not cite any authority on this point.
Police inventories of an arrested person's personal effects are con-
ducted in order to protect his belongings while he is in police cus-
tody. They do not constitute.a search and seizure provided that all
intent to search for specific evidence is lacking. If incriminating
articles are found during a legal inventory they can be admissible as
evidence at trial.1 Robbins demonstrates that inventory procedures
are subject to abuse. How could the second search be both a con-
tinuation of a search and an inventory involving no specific intent to
search? And, as the Robbins dissent pointed out, "it is questionable
whether examining a glove for its contents can be considered a legiti-
mate aspect of an inventory procedure."'18
In addition, the dissent in Robbins pointed out that the first
search of the suitcase was invalid according to the rules of Preston
and Chimel, because the defendants were in no position to destroy
evidence or endanger the safety of the officers; they were in hand-
cuffs before the search began. Since the first search was invalid, a
continuation of it could hardly be upheld. Furthermore, regardless
of the validity of the first search, the second search was not incident
to the arrest because it was not contemporaneous in time or place
10 It seems obvious, however, that having been told there were guns in the suitcase,
the police were searching for the guns, not merely making an inventory.
1 7 See United States v. Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1968); Cotton v. United
States, 371 F.2d 385, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1967); Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d
454, 456 (10th Cir. 1955); People v. Hambrick, 98 IIl. App. 2d 481, 240 N.X.2d 696
(1968). See alsq State v. Dempsey, 22 Ohio St. 2d 214, 259 N.E.2d 745 (1970),
where the inventory procedure received judicial approval although defendant's convic-
tion was reversed on other grounds.
18 424 F.2d at 60.
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with the arrest.' The Chime! rule recognizes that warrantless
searches incident to valid arrests are not desirable and should only
be permitted when absolutely necessary to protect the arresting of-
ficers or the evidence. Thus, there is no justification for a war-
rantless search removed in time or place from the arrest, even if it
is a continuation of a valid search.
The Faubion decision is consistent with past decisions which
state that the authority of a magistrate is necessary to search in all
but extreme cases.20 Faubion should not be considered a roadblock
to efficient law enforcement. The police had enough evidence to
obtain a warrant and there was no danger of the suitcase being
taken away before the warrant could be obtained. If they had not
had enough evidence to get a warrant, they would have had no
probable cause to search the suitcase, making such a search a clear
fourth amendment violation. Even though the Faubion court was
not bound by Chimel, it realized that strict adherence to the spirit
of Chimel will place no restrictions on police apart from the dear
proscriptions of the fourth amendment.
The Robbins decision, on the other hand, indicates two existing
problems in the area of a warrantless search incident to a valid ar-
rest. First, there is the danger of courts simply disregarding the
Chimel rule, probably because they think it unreasonably hampers
law enforcement. The Supreme Court can do little about this prob-
lem except through reversals. Second, there is the danger that courts
will circumvent Chimel by upholding illegal searches as valid in-
ventories. Inventories are obviously necessary, and the police cannot
be expected to disregard incriminating evidence found during in-
ventories. But it will often be impossible to determine whether the
officer involved had an intent to search for the evidence found dur-
ing an inventory. Thus, the Court will have to sharply define the
limits of a legal inventory to protect arrested persons from indis-
criminate searches of their personal possessions.
19 See cases cited note 15 supra.
20 See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Brett v. United States,
412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir.
1969).
